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This article examines how investors react to nuclear threats from North 
Korea on the South Korean stock market. To investigate the differences in 
investor groups’ responses, we divide investors into three groups: domestic 
individual, domestic institution and foreign investors. In addition, we 
classify the nuclear threats into the one actual threat and the seven verbal 
threats and compare trading activities of investors against those in the 
peaceful period of 2004. The net-buying and LSV(1992) herding measures 
are applied to examine investors’ trading behavior. Our results show that it 
was only for the case of the actual threat that investors’ trades significantly 
differed with the peaceful period. In addition, our results show that the 
three investor groups reacted to the actual nuclear threat differently. 
When the actual nuclear threat occurred, individuals sold, institutes and 
foreigners bought stocks. Like in the peaceful period, institutes showed a 
positive slope for lagged returns whereas individuals displayed a negative 
slope. Foreigners, however, bought regardless of previous returns. Moreover, 
LSV herding measure increased in all investor groups. 
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INTRODUCTION
On October 9th, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test to 
which world leaders publicly denounced and expressed concern 
over. The Korean stock market experienced a sudden drop in 
tandem with the increased negative media reports on North Korea. 
Figure 1 shows the situation of the financial market of South Korea 
around that day; the KOSPI index plummeted as trading volume 
increased with an almost doubling of stocks sold compared to the 
previous day. Domestic individual sold stocks, but foreign investors 
bought stocks. VIX which is calculated from the KOSPI 200 index 
options to represent the overall volatility of the market increased by 
more than 4% compared to that of the previous day. Thus, we can 
observe that the increased VIX measurement reflects an increased 
state of uncertainty in the investors in the market. This is further 
demonstrated in the sharp depreciation of the won against the US 
dollar, falling 2% in one day. 
North Korea has threatened the world with the nuclear weapons 
several times since 1991. From 2000 to 2006, there were seven 
verbal threats and one actual test; seven verbal nuclear threats, 
which comprise of public statements issued by North Korea through 
the media, happened on October 17th, 2002, December 12th, 2002, 
January 10th, 2003, February 10th, 2005, May 11th, 2005, July 5th, 
2006, and October 3rd, 2006. An actual test happened on October 
9th, 2006. On days where verbal threats of nuclear action were made 
by North Korea, the market was unresponsive in terms of volatility. 
However, when the actual threat occurred on 9th October, 2006, 
there was a great deal of activity. The market was quick to drop its 
value and depreciate the won. However, interestingly, the market 
quickly relaxed as the true intentions of North Korea were revealed 
to foreign observers; that they wanted not to start a war but to open 
dialogues for negotiation. In Figure 1, we can observe temporary 
changes in the market around the actual nuclear test day.
This study examines investors’ trading behavior in response to the 
nuclear threat from North Korea in the South Korean stock market. 
Even though the overall market reaction represented in the Figure 
1 seems to cool down several days after the event happens, there 
is a temporary destabilization that might happen because of some 
investors’ collective trading behavior due to the fear of the nuclear 
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threat. Thus, we will fi rst investigate how the three investor groups, 
domestic individual, domestic institute, and foreign investors, react 
to the nuclear threats. The net-buying and LSV(1992) herding 
measures are applied to examine investors’ trading behavior. More 
specifically, we will examine which investor group reacts more 
This fi gure describes the South Korean fi nancial market around October 9th, 
2006. The horizontal axis indicates trading days around the event day, which 
is the date zero. Figure 1(a) shows the highest and lowest daily KOSPI index. 
Figure 1(b) and 1(c) represent total trading volume and net buying of each 
investor group in the stock market. Figure 1(d) and 1(e) depict fear index and 
won/dollar exchange rate, respectively.
Figure 1. Descriptions of the Nuclear Test Event, October 9th, 2006
42 Seoul Journal of Business
sensitively to the nuclear threats by looking at the degree of positive 
feedback trading and herding. In addition, we classify the nuclear 
threats into the one actual test and the seven verbal threats made 
at other times and compare trading activities of investors with those 
in the peaceful period of 2004. To do this, investors trading activities 
during the two nuclear threats periods are compared to those during 
the peaceful period. Although newspapers and television have dealt 
with the nuclear threat a lot, there is no study investigating the real 
impact on the financial market. To our knowledge, this study is the 
first try to examine the effect of the nuclear threat on the market.
Not only will this study analyze the effect of the nuclear threat 
from North Korea on the market, but also aims to give a better 
understanding of market participants’ trading in response to the 
threat. More specifically, with the results of this study, we can 
infer how each investor group differently interprets the impact of 
the nuclear threat from North Korea on the stock market of South 
Korea. In addition, based on observed trading behavior of each 
investor group during the threat period, we can make a conjecture 
on ex post trading performance of each group around the threat. 
However, because this study is a clinical study with one actual and 
seven verbal threats, we cannot generalize the trading pattern of 
investor groups and impact on the market for the nuclear threat. 
Hence, with caution, the results of this paper should be interpreted 
for the anticipation of the impact of future nuclear threats on the 
market. As this is the first study for the impact on the market due 
to the nuclear threat, it explains the market situation at that event 
time and can be indicative of the market reaction in the future.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We first 
summarize the chronology of the nuclear threats from North Korea 
and existing literature about positive feedback trading and herding 
in section 2 and section 3, respectively. Empirical method used in 
this study is explained in section 4. In section 5 we describe the 
data used in our analysis. We show empirical results in section 6. 
Finally, section 7 summarizes and presents concluding remarks.
THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE NUCLEAR THREATS FROM 
NORTH KOREA
The nuclear problem has existed a long time ago. Since 1992, 
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U.S. and North Korea had had many negotiations for nuclear 
inspection of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but all 
of them ruptured. In May 1994, North Korea began to remove 
spent fuel to get some nuclear material. In the next month, North 
Korea announced its withdrawal from the IAEA. Thus, Former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter visited to North Korea and had a settlement. 
In October 1994, The United States and North Korea adopted 
the Agreed Framework in Geneva. In the result of the agreement, 
North Korea froze its nuclear facilities and allowed IAEA special 
inspections. In exchange, U.S. and other countries promised to offer 
two light-water reactors and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil. The 
first nuclear crisis calmed down in that way. 
In October 2002, the second crisis started with the dispatching 
the U.S. envoy, James Kelly. He claimed that North Korea had a 
furtive uranium enrichment program. North Korea responded that 
North Korea is entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but 
other types of weapons more powerful than them in defense of its 
sovereignty in face of the U.S. threat.1) U.S. interrupted her aid to 
North Korea. North Korea also quitted the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). The Geneva agreement was totally broken. Although 
six-party talks2) held thrice, U.S. and North Korea stood at very 
different standpoints and there was no progress.
In February 2005, North Korea declared her possession of nuclear 
weapons for the sake of self defense and indefinite postponement of 
six-party talks. In April and May the same year, the tension between 
U.S. and North Korea was increased. Furthermore, North Korea 
tried to remove spent fuel again. However, the conflict was mitigated 
as the fourth six-party talks had held from July to September.
During the fourth round of six-party talks, U.S. department of 
treasury raised the question that North Korea had distributed 
counterfeit money through Banco Delta Asia (BDA). Immediately 
after the six party talks, U.S. blockaded North Korean capital 
in BDA. The relation between the two countries was aggravated 
seriously. The first stage of the fifth six-party talks terminated 
without advance. Moreover, U.S. refused continuing negotiation 
request of North Korea about BDA problem.
  1) Source: Reuters news
  2) The participants of six-party talks are U.S, China, Japan, Russia, South and 
North Korea.
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Table 1. The Chronology of Nuclear Threats from North Korea
Dec-91
The agreement of denuclearisation was ratified. The Two Koreas 
also agreed to mutual inspections. 
Sep-92
IAEA inspectors discovered some suspicious errors in North 
Korea’s initial report on its nuclear program. 
Feb-93 The IAEA demanded special inspections but North Korea refused. 
Mar-93
North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT in 
three months
Jun-93
After talks with U.S., North Korea postponed its decision to break 
away from the NPT. 
Mar-94
IAEA inspectors visit to North Korea. North Korea refused to 
allow inspections of a plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon.
May-94
North Korea began to remove spent fuel to get some nuclear 
material.
Jun-94
North Korea announced its withdrawal from the IAEA. Former 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited to North Korea and had a 
settlement. 
Oct-94
The Geneva agreement was ratified. North Korea froze its nuclear 
facilities and allowed IAEA special inspections. In exchange, U.S. 
and other countries promised to offer some aids.
Oct-02
The U.S. envoy, James Kelly, claimed that North Korea had a 
furtive uranium enrichment program.
Dec-02
U.S. interrupted annual shipments of heavy fuel oil to North 
Korea.
Jan-03 North Korea quitted the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
Aug-03 The first six party talks held.
Feb-04 The second six party talks held.
Jun-04 The third six party talks held.
Feb-05
North Korea declared her possession of nuclear weapons for the 
sake of self defense and indefinite postponement of six-party 
talks. 
May-05 North Korea tried to remove spent fuel again.
Jul~Sep-05 The fourth six party talks held.
Sep-05
U.S. department of treasury raised the question that North Korea 
had distributed counterfeit money through Banco Delta Asia 
(BDA).  U.S. blockaded North Korean capital in BDA. 
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On July 5th, 2006, North Korea launched missiles from its 
east coast, including long ranged missile, Taepodong-2. In the 
same month, U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1695 to 
give warning against its ballistic missile program. U.S and other 
countries kept the pressures on, North Korea defied the pressures. 
On October 3rd, 2006, North Korea said that the country will conduct 
its first nuclear test but gave no date. Eventually, on October 9th, 
2006, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test. Table 1 
summarizes the chronology of nuclear threats from North Korea. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Existing literature presents us with two major trading styles to 
explain how the actions of particular groups of investors impact and 
destabilize markets; the positive feedback trading style and herding 
trading style. 
Positive feedback trading is where investors buy when the price 
goes up and sell when the price goes down. This kind of trading can 
Nov-05
The first stage of the fifth six-party talks terminated without 
advance. 
Jun-06
North Korea invited the U.S. chief envoy of six-party talks but 
refused.  
Jul 5th, 06
North Korea launched missiles from its east coast, including long 
ranged missile, Taepodong-2.
Jul-06
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1695 to give warning 
against its ballistic missile program. 
Sep-06
24 international financial institutions including chinese 
interrupted deal with North Korea.
Oct 3rd, 06
North Korea said that the country will conduct its first nuclear 
test but gave no date.
Oct 9th, 06 North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test. 
Oct-06
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 to give some 
penalty for North Korea.
Dec-06 The second stage of the fifth six-party talks held
Table 1. Continued
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make deviate the price from its fundamental value. This trading 
can increase the volatility of asset values and as such destabilize 
the market. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990)’s 
theoretical model shows that noise traders can deteriorate market 
efficiency by involving themselves in positive feedback trading. 
After their study, many researchers continued empirical and 
theoretical research on the impact of positive feedback trading in 
the market. This research had a particular focus on which investor 
groups conduct positive feedback trading and their return on that 
trading strategy. Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) observe 
institutional investors’ positive feedback trading. Nofsinger and Sias 
(1999) report that institutional investors are more likely to conduct 
positive feedback trading than individuals and that institutional 
investors’ trades have positive impact on returns. Griffin, Harris, 
and Topaloglu (2003) also confirm the frequency of institutional 
investors’ positive trading and show, on a minute level, their trading 
has some predictive power on future returns. In their study, they 
document individual investors conducting contrarian trading, 
buying after the price falls and selling after the price rises. This 
behavior among individual’s trading style has also been observed 
in Odean (1998), Barber and Odean (2000), Grinblatt and Kelharju 
(2000). 
Collective buying or selling from a particular investor group 
is called herding. Herding can be caused through five reasons; 
institutional traders’ positive feedback trades, trades based on 
trading strategy of some investor group according to the style 
of characteristics of firms, trades acting like other managers to 
keep up reputation, trades based on inferred information from 
other investors, and trades with trading strategy made by similar 
analyzing tools and correlated information (Choi and Sias, 2009; 
Wermers, 1999). Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and 
Sias(2004) introduce well known herding measure, Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) introduces CAPM style herding measure. Like 
positive feedback trading, herding can cause volatility problems in 
a market because of consecutive and dense trades in one direction 
which leads the price to deviate from its fundamental value.   
Several studies examine the impact of positive feedback trading 
and herding behavior on the market’s stability when financial crisis 
or economic stress occurs. Cohen and Shin (2004) observe trading 
behaviors when an economy is under stress, and document that 
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these trading styles become more extreme as a market increase 
in volatility. Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) examine whether foreign 
investors destabilize the market by conducting positive feedback 
trading and herding during the 1997 Korean financial crisis. In their 
results, foreign investors (classed as international based foreign 
investors and domestic based foreign investors) showed patterns 
of positive feedback trading and herding trading style prior to the 
crisis, but during the crisis, levels of positive feedback trading and 
herding significantly decreased. They conclude that foreign trading 
did not add to the volatility of the market in the crisis. However, Kim 
and Wei (2002) observe instance of strong positive feedback trading 
and herding behavior by non-resident foreign investors and imply 
that the trading behaviors of this group increase market volatility. 
This study examines the impact that investor groups (domestic 
individual, domestic institution, and foreign investors) may or may 
not contribute to market destabilization during periods of nuclear 
threat from North Korea by examining changes in their positive 





First, we divided investors into two groups, domestic and 
foreign investors. This is because most of domestic investors tend 
to concentrate their portfolios to the assets in their residential 
country. On the contrary, large international investor’s portfolios 
are diversified all around the world. Thus, domestic and foreign 
investors’ risk structures are different from each other. Additionally, 
most of individual investors are small investors and their willingness 
to pay for information, especially military intelligence, is much 
lower than domestic institutions and foreigners. Even if they 
get some military intelligence, they do not possess the ability to 
incorporate the information into their decision makings. Therefore, 
the information of individual is inaccurate relatively. So we separate 
individuals from domestic investors. Here we have three groups 
of investor, domestic individual, domestic institution, and foreign 
investors.
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Firm size
It is a well known fact that foreign investors usually trade large 
firm’s stocks in emerging market. Moreover, large stocks have high 
liquidity. So we expect to observe what we want to see in large 
stocks. We classify the stock size as small 30%, medium 40% and 
big 30% by market capitalization.
  
30 minute lagged return
The nuclear threats investigated in this article are sudden shocks 
to the South Korean market. However, the impact of the threats did 
not last long. Even for the actual nuclear test occurred at October 
9th 2006, right after the intention of North Korea revealed, the panic 
of the market was cool down in only a few days. Therefore, to gaze 
the market reaction, we need a dense time interval. So we choose 
30 minute interval. The beginning of the market is 9:00 AM and 
the closing is 3:00 PM. We split trading day into 12 intervals and 
calculate log returns each stock and each interval, respectively. To 
get the first interval returns, we use closing price the day before. We 
divide returns into 7 levels into (-100%,-1%), [-1%,-0.5%), [-0.5%,-
0.1%), [-0.1%, 0.1%), [0.1%, 0.5%), [0.5%, 1%), [1%, ∞). To get results 
conditioning on lagged returns, we do not use the first period 
trading volume and net buy. Then, we have 11 observations for a 
stock in a day. We have also performed the same examinations with 
5 minute time intervals. Because the investigation with 5 minute 
time intervals shows consistent results to that with 30 minute time 
intervals, only the results for 30 minute time intervals are reported. 
The reason why we have chosen 30 minute time intervals is that 
trading patterns of three investor groups conditional on lagged 
returns are more clearly shown in that time interval because returns 
for the unit time intervals are more evenly distributed; for the 5 
minute time interval, more than 70% of returns for the unit time 
interval is located within -0.1% to 0.1%. 
For example, if a stock j’s the day before closing price is 10,000 
won and the price at 9:30AM is 10,200 won, then the log return of 
the first interval, 9:00~9:30AM, is ln(10,200/10,000) = 1.98%. This 
return belongs to the return interval [1%,∞). If we get some certain 
numeric measure in the second interval, 9:30~10:00AM, then we 
analyze the value conditioning on the return of first interval, [1%, ∞). 
Because of data availability, most of fund herding research used 
quarterly data. Using the quarterly data has a problem that herding 
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behavior can be occurred in the shorter interval and can be missed. 
Puckett and Yan (2008) used weekly data, and they showed that 
herding measures become larger when period becomes shorter.   
       
NYSE weekly return 
Richards (2005) reported that foreign investors and external 
conditions have a significant effect on emerging markets. Froot, 
O’connell and Seasholes (2001) noted that the slope of local stock 
prices change to foreign inflows is positive and cannot be ignored. 
Thus, we divide weeks into two groups by weekly NYSE return, 
positive or negative. It can control the external effect parsimoniously. 
Every trading day has 12 intervals, 11 observations and about 
650~700 listed stocks. Therefore, we have 7150~7700 observations 
each day, approximately. Observations are classified by firm size, 
30 minute lagged return and NYSE weekly return. We pool the 
observations and calculate the average of the measures in the same 
classification.      
Measures
Net buy
There have been many complicate literatures about positive 
feedback trading. However, the net buy measure is the easiest to 
implement and interpret. So we calculate the net buy of the three 
investor groups. Let B(i, j, t) be the total amount of investors in a 
group i that who purchase the stock j in interval t. S(i, j, t) is defined 




( , , ) ( , , )
( ( , , ) ( , , ))/2
i
B i j t S i j t




The measure is normalized by the total trade volume given stock j 
in interval t.
LSV herding measure.
We use the well known LSV(1992) herding measure. Previous 
to use the measure, we summarize the idea of LSV briefly. Let b(i, 
j, t) be the number of investors in a group i that who purchase 
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the stock j in interval t. s(i, j, t) is defined similarly. Let p(i, j, t) is 
the ratio of the buyer number and the active trader number. i.e., 
p(i, j, t) is the inclination to buy for given i, j, t. LSV assumed that 
there are only active traders who buy or sell and a trade executed 
given i, j, t follows a Bernoulli distribution with p(i, j, t). The most 
critical assumption of LSV measure is an investor group has a same 
inclination to buy across all the stocks j in interval t, if there is no 
herding. i.e., ( , ) ( , , ),p i t p i j t j= ∀ .
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , )H i j t p i j t p i t E p i j t p i t= − −  −  
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We can regard p(i, t) as the empirical expectation of p(i, j, t). i.e., 
p(i, t) = E[p(i, j, t)]. Since the first term of herding measure H(i, j, 
t) has a nonzero mean, so we have to subtract some adjustment 
factor. Let b(i, j, t) + s(i, j, t) = n(i, j, t) and assume that b(i, j, t)~bin(n(i, 
j, t), p(i, t)) then we can calculate the second term. If n(i, j, t) is large, 
we can approximate the binomial as a normal. 
As noted above LSV measure has the assumption that if p(i, t) = 
E[p(i, j, t)] then there is no herding even though p(i, t) varies on time 
t. Usually, when p(i, j, t) and p(i, t) move to same direction, we can 
interpret that case as the investor follows fundamental of economy. 
i.e., it is not a herding. 
However, there exists a possibility that short-run panic or 
boom occurs as p(i, j, t) and p(i, t) move to same direction, without 
fundamental change. We consider that the event we concerned is 
in the case. So we have to be careful to interpret the measure. We 
can under-estimate the actual herding phenomena because average 
behavior also varies. 
By the assumption of the binomial distribution, b(i, j, t)~bin(n(i, j, 
t), p(i, t)) we can calculate the second term of herding measure. Let’s 
abbreviate b(i, j, t) = b, n(i, j, t) = n, p(i, t) = p, then we can write the 
second term as 
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For example, if p = 1, then the first term is zero and the second 
term is also zero. Therefore, LSV herding measure becomes also 
zero. In other words, a group of investors only buy all the stocks in 
a market but the measure is zero.
DATA
This study uses data from October 2002 to October 2006. During 
that period, seven verbal nuclear threatening and one actual 
nuclear test occurred. Seven verbal nuclear threatening happened 
at October 17th, 2002, December 12th, 2002, January 10th, 2003, 
February 10th, 2005, May 11th, 2005, July 5th, 2006, and October 
3rd, 2006. The nuclear test of the actual threat event happened at 
October 9th, 2006. Although the first actual nuclear threat occurred 
in 1994, because of limited availability of data, we analyze the 
impact of the actual threat only with the data from 2006. In 1994, 
foreigners were subjected to restrictions that specified they could 
only hold up to 12% of the total market value of individual Korean 
stocks. Therefore, the response of foreigners to the actual nuclear 
threat in 1994 could be different to that in 2006.
Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) trading tick data were obtained from 
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Korea Exchange (KRX).3) All stock transaction occurred in KRX during 
our sample period are recorded; transaction prices, trading volume, 
trading time, and investors information about nationality and kinds 
of investor group. Thus, from the data, we can distinguish investors 
into domestic institute, domestic individuals and foreigners. We 
also get the option tick data form KRX, to calculate VIX fear index 
and other data used to draw descriptive figure comes from the same 
source. From Markit data, we get the spread on the yield of Korea’s 
foreign exchange stabilization bonds. 
We also obtained quarterly market capitalization and daily, 
quarterly closing price of each stock4). Quarterly market capitalization 
and closing prices are used to classify stocks into three groups, 
small 30%, medium 40% and big 30%. Stocks which price below 
500 won are discarded because it might behave strange. And then, 
the remaining stocks are sorted by capitalization. The daily closing 
prices are regarded as the next day beginning price and those are 
used to calculate first 30 minute returns of each stock.
From Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS), we got the NYSE 
daily index level data and calculate weekly return, a Friday closing 
to the next Friday closing. We dichotomize the weeks by return, 
positive or negative. Thus we can control the effect of external 
business condition roughly. 
RESULT
We compared the days nuclear threatening happened and the next 
days with the period between July 2003 and December 2004. The 
period was relatively peaceful, although some troubles happened. 
Therefore, we choose the period as a benchmark. 
Result of net buying measure
Table2 describes net buying behaviors of group of investors 
in 2003. 7~2004. 12. The vertical axis of a table is about timing. 
‘Positive’ means that an interval t belongs to the week when the 
NYSE return is positive. ‘Negative’ has the similar meaning. The 
  3) http://www.krx.co.kr/
  4) Data guide pro(http://www.dataguidepro.com/)
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The table reports net buying behavior of each investor group in the benchmark 
period 2003.7~2004.12. Each column belongs to an investor group shows how 
the investor group behaves by firm size. Panel A represents the result when 
NYSE weekly return is negative. Similarly, Panel B represents the result when 
NYSE weekly return is positive. The net buying behavior of each column is 
divided into 7 categories of 30 minute lagged return. Every number of the table 
is reported in percentage and every number in parenthesis is the standard 
deviation of the above number.
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vertical axis also contains the information about lagged 30 minute 
return of stocks. The horizontal axis of a table is about investors 
groups and firm sizes. Note that most of phenomena which we want 
to see are revealed distinctly in big size. Every number in table is 
presented in percentage. The numbers above are the mean of the 
measures in a certain classification and the parenthesized numbers 
are the standard deviation of the measures. This format about table 
is applied for all rest of the table.
In table 2, when lagged returns are negative, institutes and 
foreigners tend to sell and individuals appear to buy shares. 
These trading patterns of three investor groups conditioning on 
lagged returns seem to be intensified as a firm size becomes large. 
Therefore we can say that institutes and foreigners are positive 
feedback traders, individuals are contrarian in that period. This 
feature is consistent with previous literature (Griffin, Harris, and 
Topaloglu, 2003; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Nofsinger 
and Sias, 1999). Moreover, the degree of positive feedback trading of 
institutes is stronger than that of foreigners.
Richards (2005) argue that NYSE index impact positively the 
performance of large companies’ shares in the Korean stock 
market. In addition, the ownership of institutes in large companies 
is relatively greater than that of institutes in small or medium 
companies. Therefore, we can guess that institutes would trade 
in response to changes in NYSE index. For individual investors, 
because of their contrarian investing, opposite response to NYSE 
weekly return with institutes are predicted. In table 2, consistent 
with our prediction, institutes (individuals) tend to buy (sell) more 
a little bit when NYSE weekly return is positive. On the other hand, 
institutes (individuals) seem to sell (buy) more when NYSE weekly 
return is negative. Foreigners strengthen positive feedback trading 
when NYSE weekly return is negative. It can be interpreted that 
foreigners become more sensitive to the Korean market movement 
during the negative NYSE weekly return period because Korean 
economy is devalued and the market volatility get raised when NYSE 
weekly return is negative.
Table 3 shows net buying behaviors on seven verbal nuclear 
threatening event days and their next days. 
Like in Table 2, institutes and foreigners do positive feedback 
trading and individuals do contrarian trading. However, dependency 
of trading on lagged return for days of negative NYSE weekly return 
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The table reports net buying behavior of each investor group in the seven 
verbal nuclear threatening events’ periods. Each column belongs to an investor 
group shows how the investor group behaves by firm size. Panel A represents 
the result when NYSE weekly return is negative. Similarly, Panel B represents 
the result when NYSE weekly return is positive. The net buying behavior of 
each column is divided into 7 categories of 30 minute lagged return. Every 
number of the table is reported in percentage and every number in parenthesis 
is the standard deviation of the above number.
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is much more strengthened than for positive NYSE weekly return. In 
particular, as lagged returns become low, positive feedback trading 
and contrarian trading seem to be intensified. The net buying of 
institutes conditioning on lagged returns less than -1% when NYSE 
weekly return is negative is -12.937 which is three times as big as 
that when NYSE weekly return is positive. This may be caused by 
temporal increase of uncertainty of the Korean stock market due 
to verbal threats from North Korea. In other words, verbal threats 
would make the market more disturbed when the performance of 
NYSE index is not good. 
Table 4 shows net buying behaviors on October 9th and 10th, 
2006 when the actual nuclear threat occurred. At the week when 





















































































































































The table reports net buying behavior of each investor group in the actual 
nuclear threatening event period. Each column belongs to an investor group 
shows how the investor group behaves by firm size. The event period is 
comprised in the weeks of positive NYSE return. The net buying behavior of 
each column is divided into 7 categories of 30 minute lagged return. Every 
number of the table is reported in percentage and every number in parenthesis 
is the standard deviation of the above number.
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the threat happened, NYSE weekly return was positive, so Table 4 
shows the case only for positive NYSE weekly return. In that time, 
foreigners had a tendency to buy stocks, regardless of previous 
lagged return, instead of positive feedback trading. More specifi cally, 
even though the lagged return of a stock was negative, they had an 
inclination to buy the stock. They changed their own behavior. The 
domestic institutes increase their net buy but they still have slopes 
to lagged return level. Compared to Table 2, institutes and foreigners 
bought more, and individuals sold more than the benchmark period. 
In summary, in the peaceful period used for the benchmark 
period, institutes and foreigners seem to do positive feedback 
trading and individuals do contrarian investing. When verbal 
nuclear threats occurred, their trading patterns changed a little 
bit; when previous return is negative, positive feedback trading 
by institutes and foreigners and contrarian trading by individuals 
become more intensifi ed than the benchmark period. However, on 
October 9th, 2006, of the actual nuclear threat day, the tendency of 
trading dependent on lagged returns almost disappeared. Regardless 
of previous 30 minute return, institutes and foreigners bought and 
individuals sold shares. This may be caused by differences in risk 
evaluation for the nuclear threat among investor groups. When 
the actual nuclear threat occurred, individuals would consider the 
threat as a realization of a war threat and expect the bear market 
for a long time so they sold shares, while institutes and foreigners 
This figure describes the spread on the yield of Korea’s foreign exchange 
stabilization bonds from July 3rd, 2006 to December 30th, 2006. The spread 
is represented by basis points.  
Figure 2. The Spread on the Yield of Korea’s Foreign Exchange Stabiliza-
tion Bonds
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might have tried to take advantage of the situation because they 
thought stocks had become temporarily undervalued. In fact, the 
actual threat seemed like it was not assessed seriously outside of 
Korea. Figure 2 shows the spread on the yield of Korea’s foreign 
exchange stabilization bonds. In the graph, the spread around the 
threat raised by 3 to 4 basis points. However, this is a very little 
increase and insignificant change compared to the increase by 300 
to 400 basis points in the late 2008 when the world-wide financial 
crisis happened. It is hard to say, with the evidence in this study, 
that institutions and foreigners bought stocks because they have 
superior information compared to individuals. However, we can say 
that institutions and foreigners’ buying came from their expectation 
that the threat would be a temporal one. 
Result of LSV herding measure 
Like positive feedback trading, herding can represent how much 
investors destabilize the market. As investors collectively trade 
in one direction, herd measure becomes large and the value of 
stock can be deviate from its fundamental value. Moreover, in the 
crisis or emergent situation, herding can be prevailing because the 
characteristic of each investor group will stick out. Therefore, we 
expect that herding will be more prevalent during the period of the 
nuclear threats from North Korea. We first calculate LSV herding in 
the peaceful period, in seven verbal threats period, and in the actual 
nuclear test period, respectively. After then we will compare the 
results to see if herding really increases in the periods with nuclear 
threats. 
Table 5 shows LSV herding in the benchmark period. Herding is 
more prevalent in the big size firms regardless of investor types and 
NYSE weekly returns. Especially, in the big size firms, foreigners’ 
herding measures is relatively higher than the others. High herding 
of one particular group indicates that this group buys more some 
stocks and sells more other stocks to their mean behavior. It 
seems that foreigners followed a fad in that period or did collective 
buying or selling in the big size category. In addition, there are no 
significant differences in herding between the weeks of negative 
NYSE return and positive NYSE returns. 
LSV herding measures for three investor groups in seven verbal 
threatening events are represented in Table 6. Panel A shows the 
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The table reports herding behavior of each investor group in the benchmark 
period 2003.7~2004.12. Each column belongs to an investor group shows 
how the investor group behaves by firm size. Panel A represents the result 
when NYSE weekly return is negative. Similarly, Panel B represents the result 
when NYSE weekly return is positive. The herding behavior of each column is 
divided into 7 categories of 30 minute lagged return. Every number of the table 
is reported in percentage and every number in parenthesis is the standard 
deviation of the above number.
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The table reports herding behavior of each investor group in the seven verbal 
nuclear threatening events’ periods. Each column belongs to an investor group 
shows how the investor group behaves by firm size. Panel A represents the 
result when NYSE weekly return is negative. Similarly, Panel B represents 
the result when NYSE weekly return is positive. The herding behavior of each 
column is divided into 7 categories of 30 minute lagged return. Every number 
of the table is reported in percentage and every number in parenthesis is the 
standard deviation of the above number.
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estimates when NYSE weekly returns are negative. Compared 
to the benchmark period, in the time intervals with negative 
previous return, herding behavior of all investor groups increases. 
In addition, institutes and foreigners herd more intensively than 
individuals. However, in panel B, there is no significant increase 
in herding behavior relative to the benchmark period. These are 
similar results to the results shown in positive feedback analysis. 
Only when NYSE weekly return is negative, investors seem to trade 
more collectively in response to the verbal threats from North Korea. 
It may be caused because the fear of investors builds up as Korea 
economy gets weaken and volatile due to low performance of NYSE 
index. 














































































































































The table reports herding behavior of each investor group in the actual nuclear 
threatening event period. Each column belongs to an investor group shows 
how the investor group behaves by firm size. The event period is comprised 
in the weeks of positive NYSE return. The herding behavior of each column is 
divided into 7 categories of 30 minute lagged return. Every number of the table 
is reported in percentage and every number in parenthesis is the standard 
deviation of the above number.
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Herding activity on October 9th and 10th of the actual nuclear test 
day and the next day are represented in Table 7. We can see that the 
herding measures increase in all the classifications when the event 
occurred. In the time intervals with negative previous return, the 
increase in institutes’ herding is much higher than that in the other 
investors while the increment of individuals’ herding is notable in 
the positive lagged return part. Therefore, we can say that investors 
herd more as the intensity of nuclear threatening increases.   
In estimation of herding behavior, we observe that investors herd 
more as the level of threat from North Korea increases. With the 
results in the positive feedback analysis, we can say that the market 
fluctuation around the nuclear test day shown in Figure 1 may be 
amplified by positive feedback trading of institutes and foreigners 
and raised herding behavior of all investors. 
CONCLUSION
We study how investors react to the nuclear threats from North 
Korea. The reaction to the nuclear threats was significant, but those 
effects only lasted a few days. Therefore, we investigate it by very 
short time intervals. We examine investors’ trading behavior in 30 
minute time intervals. Also, we divide the nuclear threats into seven 
verbal threatening events and the one actual test. Then we compare 
the level of positive feedback trading and LSV herding when North 
Korea threatens the South with nuclear weapons with investors’ 
trading activities during the relatively peaceful period. 
Institutes and foreigners do positive feedback trading and 
individuals do contrarian trading in the benchmark period when 
there are no nuclear threats. This trading pattern held true when 
North Korea verbally threatened the South. Instead, positive 
feedback trading by institutes and foreigners and contrarian trading 
by individuals intensify over the benchmark period. However, when 
North Korea actually conducted a nuclear test, the trading tendency 
dependent on lagged returns almost disappeared. Individuals 
sold, whereas institutes and foreigners bought stocks. Institutes 
(individuals) still had positive (negative) slope to lagged return but 
foreigners buy regardless of previous returns. This may be caused 
by differences in risk evaluation for the nuclear threat among 
investor groups..
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In benchmark time, the foreigners LSV herd measure is relatively 
higher than the others in big size firms. It can be interpreted as 
foreigners followed a fad in that period or, just did some collective 
trading. For the case of seven verbal threatening events, only when 
NYSE weekly return is negative, investors seem to herd more. It may 
be caused because the fear of investors builds up as Korea economy 
gets weaken and volatile due to low performance of NYSE index. On 
the other hand, when the actual nuclear test occurred, LSV herding 
measure increased in all investor groups regardless of NYSE weekly 
returns. 
From the results shown in this paper, we can infer that the 
market fluctuation around the nuclear test day may be caused 
by heterogeneous belief about the impact of the nuclear threat 
among the three investor groups and by raised herding behavior of 
all investors. Moreover, institutions and foreigners’ buying stocks 
around the actual nuclear threat seem to help the market becomes 
less destabilized. However, this paper does not find out whether 
heterogeneous belief or different risk evaluation about the threat 
among investor groups comes from information asymmetry or 
different risk attitude among the three investor groups. Further 
research on trading performance and changes in risk averseness of 
each investor group would clarify the impact of positive feedback 
trading and herding behavior in response to the North Korea nuclear 
threats on the market.  
In the last decades, there are some places where military tensions 
have existed. A few of them have capital markets. For example, 
China vs Taiwan, Middle east vs Israel, Turkey vs Greece and North 
Korea vs South Korea. Thus we can observe the reaction of the 
investors in the capital markets when military event occurs. We 
hope that this thesis give some idea for other researches related to 
similar events. 
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